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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

United States v. Phillips, 356 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the
jury conviction of a Montana land owner for violations of, and
conspiracy to violate, the Clean Water Act, but vacating and
remanding district court's sentence and penalties for re-sentencing).
David Phillips appealed his conviction in the United States District
Court for the District of Montana ("district court") for multiple
violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), conspiracy to violate the
CWA, and determination of sentence. A Montana jury found Phillips
guilty of CWA violations when he diverted a creek adjacent to land he
owned to fill twenty man-made ponds on his property.
The
government also cross-appealed the sentencing decision, claiming that
the district court erred in its interpretation of several sections of the
United States Sentence Guidelines. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal and affirmed the
conviction, but upheld the government's claims of error to vacate the
sentence for re-sentencing.
Phillips co-owned a large plot of land in Montana as a potential
subdivision investment. During August 1996, in order to attract
potential investors to the land, Phillips hired and instructed several
employees to dig and fill twenty ponds. Phillips failed to obtain
required permits for the work, and instructed his employees to lie and
tell visitors that permits were filed. Knowing that an existing mine adit
on the property was inadequate to fill the ponds before several
investors were to tour the land, Phillips instructed employees to build
and conceal a french drain that diverted water from a nearby creek,
through the ponds, and back out to the creek, even though Phillips
had no water rights to the adjacent creek.
Downstream neighbors reported the diversion when they noticed
the creek drying up and depositing dark brown sediment. State water
authorities investigated Phillips' property and found significant land
disturbance, poorly constructed ponds, unstable soil berms, and
ditches connecting the ponds together to the creek. In addition,
authorities found that Phillips had failed to stabilize soil banks, causing
erosion of sediment and mine tailings in the creek downstream.
In a pretrial motion, Phillips challenged the jurisdiction of the
criminal conviction, claiming that the district court must construe a
water of the United States as only those waters navigable-in-fact.
Phillips maintained that because the creek was not navigable-in-fact,
the government lacked jurisdiction. The court held the district court
properly considered the question ofjurisdiction as a matter of law and,
using the long-standing interpretation of the Army Corps of Engineers
and other circuit courts, properly decided to include waters tributary
to navigable waters as subject to jurisdiction. Since the district court
only found that the creek was jurisdictional, and left to the jury the
issue of determining whether and where the crime had occurred, the
district court preserved Phillips' constitutional right to a jury
determination of the elements of his crimes.
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Additionally, both parties contested the sentencing. Using the
federal sentencing guidelines, the district court had calculated a
sentence of thirty-three to forty-one months and awarded $43,000 for
cleanup expenses to Ron Burgess, the subsequent owner of the
property, after Phillips failed to make payments. The government, in
its appeal, argued that the district court erred when it refused to
increase Phillips' offense level for any Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") cleanup
expenses related to the mine tailings. Interpreting the plain language
of the guidelines as well as other circuits' case law, the court
determined that a penalty award must include CERCLA-related
expenses. Despite the overlap in coverage between CWA convictions
and CERCLA regulation, depriving the government of cleanup costs
because it proceeded under one type of law and not the other would
undermine the congressional scheme of environmental laws.
Further, the court determined that the district court improperly
considered evidence that Phillips attempted to coerce co-owner Larry
Zinger from being a witness. The district court refused to increase the
offense level under the obstruction of justice guideline because
Phillips' threats to Zinger had not materially impeded the
investigation. The court held that Phillips' attempt to influence
Zinger triggered the guideline to increase the offense level, and did
not require proof of materiality.
The government also challenged the district court's heartland
analysis when it considered Phillips' prior state prosecution and
internal agency memoranda and legislative history to apply downward
departures to the sentencing determination. A downward departure is
a reduction in sentence, and the district court can depart from the
guideline range only when an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
exists. According to the court's holding, the district court exceeded
the limits imposed under the sentencing guidelines when it
considered internal agency memoranda. The court held that Phillips'
prior state prosecution, which was only a fine, was not an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance to warrant downward departure.
Finally, the district court denied restitution to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, finding that the government was
not a victim entitled to recover. The Ninth Circuit held that the
decision was in error, and the government can be considered a victim
for restitution purposes. However, the government is only able to
receive restitution for those costs incurred as a direct and foreseeable
result of Phillips' wrongful conduct, not for costs incurred during the
regular investigation of the criminal prosecution.
Overall, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Phillips' conviction of
violations under the CWA and conspiracy to violate the CWA, holding
that the district court properly considered the issue of jurisdictional
waters as a matter of law in its pretrial motion and did not impede
Phillips' constitutional rights in its jury instructions. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the conviction, but also ruled in favor of the government's
cross-appeal that the sentence determination was improper, and thus
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remanded to the district court for re-sentencing.
DaraLum

TENTH CIRCUIT
Pittsburgh County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358
F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that federal law preempts state or
local statutes that deprive a water district of the right to provide water
to customers within the district so long as the water district is indebted
to the federal government under 7 U.S.C. § 1926 and provides water
service to customers of the district).
Pittsburgh County Rural Water District No. 7 ("District") sued the
City of McAlester ("McAlester"), a competing water provider, and
additional entities in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma. The District alleged that McAlester violated its
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by restricting its ability to provide water
to customers within a protected area designated by 7 U.S.C. § 1926 and
that McAlester violated federal and state antitrust law by refusing to
sell water to the District. The District requested a declaratory
judgment regarding McAlester's ability to market water in the District's
territory, and injunctions requiring McAlester to continue selling
water to the District. The district court granted McAlester summary
judgment on some of the District's claims, dismissed the remaining
claims under section 1926, and dismissed both the District's federal
and state antitrust claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held section 1926 could protect the District's rights, and
remanded the case to the district court for determination. The court
also held that section 1926 did not entitle the District to an injunction
requiring McAlester to sell the District water, and dismissed the
District's claim that McAlester violated antitrust laws because the
District failed to prove McAlester acted as a monopolist.
The District is an Oklahoma water association incorporated by the
Pittsburgh County Commissioners to provide water for rural residents.
An amendment to section 1926 authorized the Farmers Home
Administration ("FMHA") to loan money to water associations so that
they could assist with water development, use and conservation allowed
the District to finance its actions. Section 1926 prohibits outside
entities from limiting the area serviced by indebted water districts
either by inclusion of the serviced area within another provider's
service area, or by granting a franchise for service in the area served by
the indebted district. The District borrowed money from FMI-A in
1967 and remained indebted until 1989. The District again borrowed
money from FMHIA in 1994. The District serviced areas both within
and outside the borders of McAlester.
Following the District's first federal suit against McAlester, the

